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I. INTRODUCTION
The states, and the federal government, are constitutionally permit-
ted to restrict or prohibit the sale of sexually explicit materials, at least
within limits. The most significant limitation on the government's re-
strictive power is that material cannot be condemned as obscene if the
material is found by the trier of fact to possess "value" of a certain kind.
It is the purpose of this Article to sort out and seek to resolve the out-
standing problems associated with value standards. If such problems
can be satisfactorily resolved, this would provide a reason not to
decriminalize all otherwise obscene materials out of sheer jurispruden-
tial frustration, rather than conviction. The standards advocated below
would not constitutionally protect some materials, but would remain
faithful to the underlying value logic of the free speech and free press
clauses.
The Supreme Court majority in Miller v. CaliforniaI imposed as a
constitutional requirement that if a state is to convict a criminal defend-
ant in an obscenity case, it must show that the allegedly obscene work"taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value."12 The Court explicitly superseded the prior test of Memoirs v.
Mlassachusetts3 which required a showing that the work be "utterly with-
out redeeming social value." 4 The Court's revised formulation of this
requirement in Miller was undeniably well-considered. This Article ex-
amines whether the formulation was constitutionally or otherwise opti-
mal. Indisputably, virtually every word of the Miller test regarding the
work's value raises litigable issues of interpretation, some of a
profound sort.5
* Associate Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford
University.
1. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
2. Id. at 24. The Supreme Court's latest, and less than entirely felicitous, es-
say into value determinations in obscenity cases is Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918
(1987), discussed below.
3. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
4. 413 U.S. at 24 (quoting Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 419) (emphasis in Miller).
5. The Court referred to its overall obscenity standard as one of "basic guide-
lines" to orient the finder of fact. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. It has continued, however,
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II. TAKING THE VALUE OF THE WORK AS A WHOLE
Working through the test, the first requirement is that the value in-
quiry consider the work "as a whole."' 6 The Court's intent in focusing
on the work as a whole is evidently to discourage excesses of both sup-
pression and permissiveness. However, the test for value is otherwise
formulated, a work of acknowledged value should not be condemned
on the basis of isolated, incidental, meretricious passages. 7 Neither,
though, should an otherwise obscene work be protected merely be-
cause it is modestly adorned with an intellectually invigorating quota-
tion from Voltaire on the flyleaf, or in the introductory credits. 8
Just as the whole may be greater than the sum of the parts, so the
value of a work, taken as a whole, may be greater or less than the value
of the sum of its parts. The value of a work as a whole cannot reliably
be said to reflect the value, or lack thereof, of even a clear majority of
its pages, sections, chapters, or frames. This is for two major reasons.
First, a theme or aspect of a work may be recognizably the primary or
predominant theme of the work even though a page count reveals that
most pages are not directly linked to that theme. By way of analogy, a
ring may be mostly setting in a physical sense, but if it has a gemstone,
the ring's value will more crucially reflect that of the gem. Second, and
by way of contrast, it is plausible to argue that a work may be subject to
prohibition even though it is "mostly" or preeminently constituted by
valuable, or at least unobjectionable, material. This possibility reflects
the recognition that parts of a whole may do more than lie in proximity
to one another. They may be detectably organically related to one an-
other. Alternatively, they may be only arbitrarily or gratuitously placed
together.
Therefore, a reasonable trier of fact in a given case may conclude
that the bulk of a work is of the requisite value, but that some remain-
ing portion, say twenty percent, is utterly devoid of any value of any
sort and is therefore itself obscene. If there is no traceable organic re-
lationship between these two portions of the work, it is not unreasona-
ble under the Miller standard to put the author or publisher to the
choice between suppression of the whole work as presented, or the sev-
erance of the offending from the larger, unoffending segments. By hy-
pothesis, the severance would not impair the work's organic unity. In
brief, if a short work is obscene under Iiller, it does not become pro-
to adhere to this precise formulation with unswerving fidelity. See, e.g., Smith v.
United States, 431 U.S. 291, 300 (1977); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 105 S.
Ct. 2794, 2798-99 (1985). Of course, there is some not-fully-determined scope
within which state statutory or jury instruction formulations may depart from the
.Miller formulation, yet remain within constitutionally permissible bounds.
6. 413 U.S. at 24.
7. See Penthouse International, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (11 th Cir.
1980), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931 (1980).
8. See Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 231 (1972).
316 [Vol. 22:315
OBSCENITY
tected merely because a distributor sells it glued to the last page of The
Brothers Karamazov. Nor does the cause of freedom of speech and press
suffer cognizably if the entire glued-together melange is duly sup-
pressed, despite the classic status of the greater component of this com-
pound work.
III. "LACK" AND THE VALUE DETERMINATION
Assuming, then, a focus on the work as a whole, the task becomes
that of interpreting how the state is to show a "lack" of some sort of
value. The nature of this showing is only partially elucidated by the
recognition that it is "serious" value of some sort, a lack of which the
state is to show. The language following "lacks" cannot, by its nature,
solve all interpretive problems. A work might utterly lack serious value
of a given sort, or it might only substantially lack serious value of such a
sort while demonstrating "some" serious value or at least a "scintilla"
of serious value.
The literal meaning of "lack" is probably closer to "utterly lacks,"
or an absolute lack. This literal interpretation of "lacks" would seem
inconsistent, however, with the logic of the Miller court in rejecting the
Memoirs requirement of showing that the material at issue is "utterly
without redeeming social value," 9 on the theory that such a burden on
the state was "virtually impossible to discharge under our criminal stan-
dards of proof."' 10
In an effort to determine whether the Miller formulation is a signifi-
cant improvement in light of the Court's own purposes, this Article
considers the relationship between the Memoirs and Miller tests in great
detail below. In the meantime, just as we cannot fully clarify "lacks" by
looking ahead to "serious value," we cannot fully clarify the term
"lacks" by looking backward to the requirement of taking the work as a
whole. The courts can and must look everywhere in the work, or to its
preeminent theme, in context, in the light of the relationship of the
parts of the work to one another, or the absence of such relationships,
when looking for value, or showing lack of value. This does not tell us
whether finding, say, a scintilla of (serious) value of the proper sort will
bar an otherwise valid obscenity conviction, considering the work as a
whole.
The notion of serious value itself raises problems both of interpreta-
tion and of normative appropriateness. Is there such a thing, for exam-
ple, as "mere" value of the relevant sort, as opposed to "serious" value
of the relevant sort? It is often supposed that there is such a thing as
"mere" value, as, for example, in one reviewing court's determination,
9. 413 U.S. at 22 (citing Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. at 418) (empha-
sis in Miller).
10. Id.
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in evaluating the films at issue, that "each film is devoid of any value, let
alone any serious value, aside from its intended commercial purpose to
cater to a prurient interest in sex.""
IV. "SERIOUS" VALUE AND "IMPORTANT" VALUE
Pursuing the nature of the distinction between value and serious
value, as a matter of the magnitude or character of the value, courts
have sometimes suggested that serious value implies, if it is not synony-
mous with, "important value."' 12 At least as a rough approximation,
though, serious value would seem easier to show, or less restrictive,
than important value. Certainly a work could be "serious" without ris-
ing to the level of being "important." This may be partly because of
the greater selectivity implied by the notion of "important" value, and
partly because "seriousness," even of value, seems to partake more of
the author's intent than does the intent-independent concept of a
work's "importance". "Important" implies "successful," at least more
than does "serious."
One distinguished commentator has maintained in this connection
that the Court's message is:
If you plan to write a novel that contains explicitly sexual scenes that an
average person in a remote community would judge to be titillating or
shocking, you had better make sure that it has important literary value;
if it turns out to be merely mediocre on literary grounds, your pub-
lisher may end up in jail. 13
This is doubtless too demanding a formulation of the Court's intent.
The Court's requirements need hardly be read as so rigorous. A book
may still be a work that has at least some "serious" literary value even
though it is not in any sense "important" because it is universally rec-
ognized as of only average or ordinary quality in all respects and is
incontestably "merely mediocre on literary grounds."' 4 Such a work
may even possess not merely "some" serious value, but a substantial
amount of serious value, if the latter standard is thought to be both
higher and constitutionally required.
Even slight departures from language recommended broadly by the
Supreme Court may be argued to constitute deviations prejudicial to
the free speech rights of obscenity defendants. For example, it may
seem inconsequential to formulate the issue as whether the allegedly
obscene materials "are presented in a sufficiently 'serious' manner to
11. United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 837 (11 th Cir. 1982).
12. See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 652 S.W.2d 370, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)
(en banc).
13. Feinberg, Pornography and the Criminal Law, 40 U. Prrr. L. REV. 567, 602
(1979).
14. Id.
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warrant invocation of the first amendment."' 15 Error can credibly be
predicated upon a jury instruction taking this form, though, because
the Supreme Court has more precisely indicated that what counts is not
the seriousness of the manner of presentation, or even the seriousness
of the work's content or message, but the seriousness of the work's
value. ' 6
V. SERIOUS IDEAS AND SERIOUS VALUE
An even more subtle, but readily litigable, departure from a plain
reading of the Supreme Court's formulation is exemplified by the lan-
guage from the Texas case of Andrews v. State. 1 7 The court in Andrews
characterized the relevant test as "whether the material advocates or
communicates any ideas or opinions concerning serious literary, artis-
tic, political, or scientific values."' 8 Setting aside any concern for the
categories of values themselves, courts must decide whether there must
be ideas concerning serious values, or whether the ideas themselves must
be serious, or themselves have serious value. Clearly, there is a poten-
tial difference. One might seek to communicate a not-particularly-seri-
ous idea, or a frivolous idea or opinion, about a serious value or
subject.
It is arguable that the Andrews formulation is in fact a superior for-
mulation. This is because it may well be that there is a broader, more
nearly objectively-based consensus as to what sorts of values or subjects
are serious than there is about whether a given particular idea itself is"serious." Government monetary policy is by consensus a serious sub-
ject or "value." Statements about such policy, or that communicate or
convey some rudimentary idea or message relating to such policy,
could be securely protected under the Andrews formulation. If the test
is instead a matter of the "seriousness" of the particular idea - e.g.,
that monetary policy is in fact dictated by some nefarious international
cabal based in Zurich - courts may have to decide cases not only on
more of a case-by-case basis, but on a basis giving broad scope to the
expression of mere jury prejudice against unpopular ideas. The Andrews
formulation, perhaps inadvertently, enhances predictability and fair-
ness in free speech adjudication, while still faithfully serving the ac-
knowledged broad purposes of the free speech clause.9
15. Leventhal, An Empirical Inquiry into the Effects of Miller v. California on the
Control of Obscenity, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 810, 930 (1977).
16. See the literal formulation of the authoritative language of Miller, 413
U.S. at 24.
17. 652 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc).
18. Id. at 384.
19. See generally Wright, A Rationalefrom J.S. Mill for the Free Speech Clause, 1985
SuP. CT. REV. 149 (P. Kurland, G. Casper & D. Hutchinson eds. 1986).
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VI. VALUE AND USE
The question then arises whether, in making the serious value de-
termination, courts are to consider the work "in itself," on its own mer-
its, or, instead, in some particular context. That courts are to consider
the work as a whole means that they must consider the "internal con-
text" of an allegedly obscene passage or illustration. For example, this
may be helpful in rescuing explicit illustrations in medical school anat-
omy texts. There are "external" contexts as well. The Washington stat-
ute at issue in Brockett v. Spokane Arcades20 spoke, for example, of
considering the value of the work "in the context in which it is
used .... , 21
It seems realistic and fair to allow the defendant to place the alleg-
edly obscene work in context. There may be some difference, though,
between the context in which the work is ordinarily used, the context in
which it was actually "used" in a given case, and the context in which
the author genuinely intended the work to be used. Control over the
use of a work, even by those with the legal right to control, may be
imperfect. 22 A work intended for use by one sort of audience may be
foreseeably or unforeseeably "intercepted" in another context, such as
retail display, by another audience, perhaps ofjuveniles.2 3 Miller is best
interpreted to protect the author of an otherwise serious work that is
unforeseeably used in some depraved, frivolous context, while permit-
ting the suppression of a work that might be of value in some conceiva-
ble context, but which is, to the author's knowledge, uniformly used in
circumstances that render the use of the work without the constitution-
ally requisite value.
VII. VALUE, COMMUNITY, AND EXPERTISE
Of course, a local community within which a work is disseminated
may also be said to be a context within which the work is used. The
Court has loosely approved the application of divergent community
standards in obscenity cases, despite constitutional objections.2 4 It is
easy to argue, though, that if a work is of value for the nation as a
whole, or in a national "context," it is unjustifiable, if not incoherent, to
claim that it is not of value within the particular community in which the
obscenity trial is being held. Certainly, a work may be of broad or "na-
20. See 105 S. Ct. 2794 (1985).
21. Id. at 2797.
22. See, e.g., United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S.
123, 129 (1973); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 143 (1973).
23. See, e.g., American Booksellers Ass'n v. Virginia, 792 F.2d 1261 (4th Cir.
1986), prob. juris. noted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3569 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1987) (No. 86-1034); Up-
per Midwest Booksellers v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1985);
M.S. News Co. v. Casado, 721 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1983).
24. See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (1974).
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tional" interest, but not interest anyone in a local area. While lack of
local interest may imply that the work is not locally valued, a work
clearly can be valuable even if it is not subjectively valued by a given
community. On the most common accounts, a local community can,
subjectively, fail to perceive the value in a work that is by consensus
detectable by recognized experts or those widely regarded as well-
tutored in the subject matter. 2 5
This argument does not require as a premise that the serious liter-
ary value, for example, of a work be "objective" in the sense of some
quality or property that is invariant or incontestable, or precisely mea-
surable and independent of any observer. Value, whether recognized
or not, 2 6 is unavoidably valuefor some person or group, or broader
society, in the sense of bearing upon their recognized or unrecognized
interests, aims, or desires. Value may also be interpreted as only value
according to, or in the opinion of, or as recognized by at least one ob-
server, based on a range of standards and kinds of evidence.
If the recognized literary critics, then, unanimously find serious lit-
erary value in a work, the Miller test is reasonably interpretable as per-
mitting a judge, at trial or on appeal, to effectively overrule a local jury
on the precise issue of serious literary value. There is no disputing
Judge Posner's observation that "evaluation of a work of (purported)
art [may be relatively] difficult and uncertain, ' 2 7 and that "the values,
experiences, and preconceptions of the adjudicator" may play a signifi-
cant role. 28 The same is true, to at least some degree, of medical diag-
nosis. But courts would not be unduly reluctant to overrule a jury's
untutored collective medical diagnosis, especially if no relevant evi-
dence were presented to them, if the consensually recognized expert
medical community were of another opinion, and for reasons that the
jury would not necessarily be assumed to have considered or compre-
hended. The detection of literary merit in a work at least falls between
the process of medical diagnosis and a purely arbitrary expression of
25. In Jenkins v. Georgia, for example, the Court might have rescued the film
"Carnal Knowledge" not by announcing that the local jury was legally mistaken in
finding the film patently offensive on community standards - a dubious rationale
for reversal - but by noting the widespread critical acclaim of the merits of the
film, and finding such to be, perhaps, sufficient "nationally-based consensus" or
expert evidence of value to save the work. See Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 153-61 (1974).
But cf Finnis, "Reason and Passion": The Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and Ob-
scenitY, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 222, 240-41 (1967) (seeking to protect the "classics" as
implicitly part of, rather than offenders against, current community standards).
26. See E.J. BOND, REASON AND VALUE 57-58, 84 (1983). Bond argues that "[i]t
is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of the end's being worthwhile that it
is in fact desired, even when the relevant beliefs are true." Id. at 58.
27. Posner, Free Speech in ai Econooiic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1, 25
(1986).
28. Id
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equal-status personal tastes and preferences, where evidence, reason,
and insight play no role.
It is true as well, as Justice Douglas argued, that "what may be trash
to me may be prized by others." 29 It is more pertinent to observe that
we do not distribute art professorships, or museum curatorships, on a
random basis, even if we are a bit nervous about the objectivity of our
precise rankings of the artistic merits of the great masters. The con-
noisseur's studied determination that a Turner is of greater serious aes-
thetic value than a painting of the pool-playing dogs is not the same
kind of determination as a preference for chocolate to vanilla, even if
the ice-cream evaluator offers sensible reasons for her preference.
In the realm of social policy, the point has been made in the follow-
ing terms:
In supposing, for example, that the elimination of racism has intersub-
jective value, we suppose that racists do not simply differ with us in
taste, but that they are blinded to the impersonally apprehensible evils
of racism, either by a refusal to consider them impersonally or by an
incapacity to appreciate what they apprehend. If, we think, the blinders
of privilege, self-interest, and ignorance were to be stripped away in a
situation that allowed full impersonal attention, they too would share
our impersonal preference.3 0
It goes without saying that the jury selection and judicial trial process
generally, in the obscenity context and elsewhere, does not guarantee
the latter transformation. Particularly if no evidence on the matter is
introduced other than the allegedly obscene works themselves, the jury
may conceivably be blind to value that may require assistance or exper-
tise to discover. The court on appellate review may, with some degree
of reliability, detect such blindness. 3'
VIII. VALUE AND THE NECESSARY PRESENCE OF AN IDEA
If there must be a direct response to the relativistic logjam feared by
Justice Douglas - "what may be trash to me may be prized by
others" 3 2 - it should perhaps be that the others are right, and the ma-
terial they champion should be protected under the Miller test if they
can articulate or otherwise establish the presence and communication
of, some sort of "idea" falling within the categories of value stipulated
29. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 137
(Douglas, J., dissenting); cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ("it is ...
often true that one man's vulgarity is another man's lyric").
30. S. DARWALL, IMPARTIAL REASON 141 (1983) (emphasis in the original).
31. While it is conceivable that a local jury may purport to find serious literary
value in a work where such value is undetectable to a fully-briefed appellate court,
we may assume that in many such cases, the jury may more effectively insulate its
verdict by also finding that the work is not patently offensive to community
standards.
32. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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by Miller, i.e., literary, artistic, political, and scientific. 33 While the
"idea" intended to be conveyed need not be some crudely literal"message," so that, for example, we protect the Beethoven Fifth Sym-
phony only if we determine that it is somehow about the nobility of
struggling against fate, there must be an intent to communicate some
rudimentary, not necessarily intellectualized, sort of idea falling within
the Miller categories. 3 4
Interpreting the Miller serious value requirement to demand no
more than some rudimentary idea of a sort falling within the Miller cate-
gories draws some of the sting of Justice Brennan's objection that
"[t]he Court's approach necessarily assumes that some works will be
deemed obscene-even though they clearly have some social 35 value-
because the State was able to prove that the value, measured by some
unspecified standard, was not sufficiently serious' to warrant constitu-
tional protection." 36 On our interpretation of Miller, the Court need
not make the exceptionally subjective determination of the "serious-
ness" of the work or idea itself. The potential for judicial arbitrariness
or abuse of such a nebulous standard, particularly during stressful or
uneasy historical periods, is clear.3 7 On our interpretation, the courts
need make only the occasionally difficult, but at least minimally logic-
bounded, inquiry into the intended presence of an idea of the proper
sort, whether or not that intended idea was understood or "received"
by its audience. An idea is of a constitutionally suffiient sort, under
Miller, if it is a literary idea, or an artistic idea, or a political idea, or a
scientific idea, independent of any judgment of the seriousness of the
idea. There is no need to assume under Miller that the word "idea"
functions precisely the same in each of these contexts. An idea in the
realm of artistic communication may be utterly unlike an idea in the
realm of scientific communication. But this need be of no constitutional
consequence.
Of course, terms such as "artistic" and "political" can be employed
in narrower or broader senses.3 8 The Miller formulation itself suggests,
however, that while the courts should be sensitive to important broadly
33. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
34. For some of the relevant issues and complications, see Wright, supra note
19.
35. Actually, the Court in Miller had explicitly rejected the allegedly ambigu-
ous concept of "social importance" as a value category. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 25
n.7. The categories of literary, artistic, political, and scientific value presumably re-
place the more readily abused notion of "social" value.
36. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 97 (1973) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (emphasis in original).
37. See generallv Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1985).
38. For an example of the use of "political" in a particularly broad sense in
the context of free speech debate, see Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory
and Doctrine, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1137 (1983).
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encompassing understandings of the realm of the political, for exam-
ple, they are not to assume that every articulated interpersonal dispute
is inevitably a matter of political expression in the sense intended in
Miller. Perhaps every truly voluntary, non-compulsive, fully informed
transaction in allegedly obscene goods between competent buyers and
sellers in at least some sense enhances the subjective welfare of both,
else it would not be agreed upon and undertaken. It is value-enhancing
in this sense, but the value involved need not inevitably be described as
including the communication of a political idea. A less disingenuous
way of describing at least some such transactions would advert to a sim-
ple market exchange of money, or financial value, for erotic value of
one sort or another. The value conferred by the supplier of such
materials may be essentially private or personal to the buyer - "auto-
biographical" - in a way not intended by the Miller Court to be encom-
passed within the admittedly broad realm of the political, or of political
ideas.
Such a line of demarcation would hardly be irrational. One can
readily imagine a set of rational Framers seeking to constitutionally
protect the political idea-communicative elements of market transac-
tions, while countenancing the government's regulating the financial,
autobiographically erotic, or other transaction-motivating values that
may be characterized as political only in an extended sense upon the
showing merely that the regulation promotes some significant govern-
mental interest. It is perfectly conceivable that to the Framers, unen-
cumbered discussion and debate on broadly public issues was both
fairly distinguishable and more worth fighting and dying on the battle-
field for, than unencumbered consumer choice in an inconceivable vari-
ety of erotic stimulants.
There is as well an independent argument, grounded in the value of
political stability, in favor of interpreting Miller to require a showing of
not merely an absence of genuinely "serious" value, but an absence of
any intended even rudimentary idea falling within one of the specified
categories. The latter standard, which requires less judicial "grading"
of the idea at issue, is more consonant with the valuable civic virtues of
mutual political restraint and mutual political compromise. It avoids
the greater suppression of a demanding "serious" value standard,
while taking seriously the claim that some allegedly obscene materials
are both deeply and widely offensive and do not even purport to signifi-
cantly implicate any of the range of values or aims that distinctively un-
derlie the doctrine of freedom of speech. 39 In order for "distaste for
the content of the speech" to be an "impermissible" basis for govern-
39. For discussion of the mutual restraint value, see Rawls, The Idea of an Over-
lapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES 1, 21 (1987).
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ment regulation,40 the "speech" at issue must first be speech for consti-
tutional purposes. The literal or figurative speech attendant upon some
allegedly obscene works may simply not be speech in the requisite
sense if core values and attributes such as discussion, reflection, issues,
information, and debate are only tangentially implicated.4 '
Thejudicial task, on the theory outlined above, in some cases admit-
tedly may not be simple. Just as the court should not infer the absence
of the requisite kind of idea from the racy promotion or advertising of
the work, so the court need not take implausible post-hoc assertions of
defense counsel as to the true nature of the work at face value. Applied
as intended, though, the above interpretation minimizes the risk that
works will be struck down because of government disapproval of the
ideas expressed. 42 If the defendant can show government disapproval,
or any other attitude, toward the ideas expressed in the work, the work
is presumably protected by the free speech clause. In sum, then, a pro-
fessed desire to "rely on the capacity of the free marketplace of ideas to
distinguish that which is useful or beautiful from that which is ugly or
worthless" 4 3 is not, by its terms, a purely libertarian standard; to qual-
ify, there must be an idea of a cognizable sort.
IX. "REDEEMING" VALUE
Confusion is further reduced if courts set aside the idea that the
work's value must be "redeeming" value. The language of "redeem-
ing" value is a holdover from Memoirs v. Massachusetts,44 in which the
Court's plurality imposed the requirement that the allegedly obscene
material be "utterly without redeeming social value."' 4 5 While the
Court in Miller repudiated the terminology of "social value ' 4 6 and ap-
parently objected to the "utterly" language as impossibly requiring the
state to prove a negative, 47 it did not explicitly disavow the idea that
value was to be "redeeming," even though such language does not ap-
pear in the Miller "serious value" formulation.
While other approaches are possible, it seems best to assume that
40. See Note, Community Standards and Federal Obscenit, Prosecutions, 55 S. CAL.. L.
REV. 693, 703 (1982).
41. See id. for the implicit reliance on the concepts of "discussion," "issues,"
and "information."
42. See id. at 723.
43. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 321 (1977) (Stevens,J., dissent-
ing) (citingJustice Holmes' "test of truth" of ideas rationale set forth in his dissent-
ing opinion in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)).
44. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
45. Id. at 418, 419.
46. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 25 n.7.
47. See id. at 22. Of course, the state still arguably was required under Miller
to "prove a negative," that the material did not have serious value of the right sort.
See Paris Adult Theatre 1, 413 U.S. at 98 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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all value of the proper sort is (some amount of) serious value, and that
the work's value, as somehow quantitatively determined, need not be
found to be of a magnitude sufficient to somehow outweigh the work's
less attractive qualities. The language of "redeeming value" retains
some current vitality in Supreme Court"8 and other 49 opinions constru-
ing state obscenity statutes. However, it is either unnecessary or mis-
leading in suggesting a balancing ofjudicially determined value against
the egregiousness of the work, as though a particularly offensive work
could perhaps only be "redeemed" by some sort of porportionately
great perceived value. Balancing the precise degree of offensiveness of
a work against its precise degree of, for example, literary merit, should
be a daunting task.
Taking the formulations as a whole, it is clear that the Court as-
sumed that the Miller "serious value" of a specified category standard
would be easier for the government to meet than the Memoirs "utterly
without redeeming social value" standard. 50 Despite the consensus on
the correctness of this assumption, 5' it has been rightly observed that
since the Miller formulation took effect, the country witnessed no sub-
stantial reduction in the quantity or explicitness of sexual materials, 52
and apparently "neither the total number of obscenity prosecutions nor
the nationwide conviction rate in cases actually brought has substan-
tially changed since the [Miller] decision was rendered. '53 It has been
found, contrary to expectations, "that the conviction rate under the old
standard was fairly high and that Miller did not materially affect it." 5 4
48. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2794, 2801 (1985).
49. See, e.g., Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance, 648 F.2d 1020, 1027 (5th Cir.
1981) ("serious redeeming value" standard allegedly under Miller), cert. denied sub
nom. Theatres West, Inc. v. Holmes, 455 U.S. 913 (1982); People v. Hall, 143 Ill.
App. 3d 766, 491 N.E.2d 757 (1986).
50. See the explicit comparison drawn in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S.
87, 116 (1974). See also Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity, Law: Toward a Moral The-
or), of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 71 (1974) (lighter burden on prose-
cution under Miller than under MWemoirs); Leventhal, An Empirical Inquio into the
Effects of Miller v. California on the Control of Obscenity, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 810, 811,
929 (1977) (discussing case disposition trends). Dean Choper has similarly argued
that "Miller v. California permits government a substantially broader authority to
regulate sexual materials than did Roth v. United States and its progeny." J. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 126 (1980).
51. See, e.g., supra note 50.
52. See Leventhal, supra note 50, at 930. See also United States v. Various Arti-
cles of Obscene Merchandise, Schedule No. 2102, 709 F.2d 132, 136 (2d Cir. 1983)
(Meskill,J., concurring in result) (raising the possibility that if the materials at issue
are as a matter of law not patently offensive by contemporary New York standards,
nothing is obscene in New York).
53. Leventhal, supra note 50, at 928.
54. Id. at 929. Note, incidentally, that the convictions in the Pope and Jo rrison
cases addressed recently by the Court were obtained under the "virtually impossi-
ble" to discharge Memoirs standard. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
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Assuming the accuracy of such empirical findings, there may be nu-
merous contributing causes of various sorts. One step toward an expla-
nation is the recognition that a jury might well not find the Memoirs and
Miller standards substantially different, or not find the latter to be sig-
nificantly laxer. Memoirs requires an "utter absence," but a jury might
interpret Miller to require an "utter absence" as well, on the theory that
absence or lack means "utter" absence. While a jury under Miller might
ask whether the value of the work is "serious," a jury under Memoirs
might ask whether the work's value is truly "redeeming" or not. More-
over, a jury under Miller might tend to assume that all genuine value is"serious" value. It is even possible that a jury that finds literary or ar-
tistic value under Miller might narrowly interpret the term "social," and
fail to find "social" value in the work under Memoirs.
X. IDEAS AND ARTISTIC EXPRESSION
The range of interpretive questions raised by the Miller value formu-
lation is nearly inexhaustible. Many of the most important can be re-
solved along the lines suggested above. It is still possible to argue,
though, that the emphasis on "ideas," even in the literary and artistic
realms, is insensitive to the nature of art and artistic expression, and
that our approach in this respect in fact amounts to "the constitutional
canonization of sheer philistinism. ' 5 5
Professor Finnis observes that:
Aesthetics contains a welter of conflicting doctrines, but there is uni-
versal agreement that artistic work does not derive its artistic value from
any "message" which it may happen to convey and which could be
presented in the form of ordinary discursive thinking. Aesthetic atten-
tion is not looking at something in order tofind out about something. 5 6
However, the approach endorsed above does not commit the courts to
protect artistic works only to the extent that the work constitutes a kind
of tract in which an otherwise plainly articulable message is distortedly
expressed in translation through art. What is an "idea" for, say, scien-
tific purposes need not be the same kind of thing as an idea for aes-
thetic purposes. An idea, and its expression in the artistic realm, need
not be purely intellectualized or essentially propositional. 5 7
Potential disagreement in this regard falls away when it is recog-
nized that:
What makes art art is not that it stimulates feelings, which any family
picture album can do, but that it expresses them symbolically. To be
55. Finnis, "Reason and Passion": The Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and
Obscenity, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 222, 231 (1967).
56. Id. (emphasis in original).
57. Cf. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First
Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 77 (1974) (interpreting Miller as protecting non-
propositional artistic "expression").
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more precise, art expresses ideas of feeling, and it does this by embody-
ing these ideas in the more or less conventional symbolic forms of mu-
sic, painting, sculpture, architecture, poetry, drama, and prose. 58
On Professor Finnis' own emphasis, art necessarily involves the expres-
sion of ideas of one sort or another. One may, of course, wish to ques-
tion whether the emphasis on "feeling" is always satisfactory - a
Beethoven Trio might appeal as much to the intellect 59 as to the senses,
or emotions, or to "feelings"- but this does not affect our argument.
One may simply adopt one's own substitute conception to fill in the
blank left by "ideas of -," however one likes.
Courts must not become too cavalier, though, in conferring free
speech protection on art merely because art may express something, in
some sense. Minimally, an idea of the sort described above must be
present. Courts should not take too sweepingly Professor Feinberg's
remark that "when the only 'conduct' involved is the expression of
some proposition, attitude, or feeling in speech or writing, or of
whatever it is that gets 'expressed' in art, music, drama, or film, then
restrictive legislation would seem to contravene the explicit guarantees
of the first amendment."'60 If a particular work of art expresses nothing
more than, say, the craftsmanship or prideful attention to detail that
might be "expressed" by a skilled bricklayer in virtually all of his work,
it is not clear why the artist should be able to invoke the protection of
the free speech clause any more than the bricklayer, because we will
have been given no reason to relevantly distinguish the alleged artistic
expression from ordinary, unpretentious bricklaying.
XI. PORNOGRAPHIC VALUE
Even if it is agreed that mere invocation of the honorific title of art
does not necessarily confer free speech protection, it may be argued
that the alleged value of some or all pornographic works transcends the
category of artistic or literary value. Some or, perhaps more disquiet-
ingly, all pornography has been defended on independent value
grounds. In one case, "the district court noted that the behavioral psy-
chologist, B.F. Skinner, had recently cited with approval the theologian
Paul Tillich for his defense of pornography as 'extending sexuality into
58. Finnis, supra note 55, at 232-33 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
59. Finnis quotes the Bloomsbury art critic Clive Bell to the following effect:
"Before we feel an aesthetic emotion for a combination of forms, do we not per-
ceive intellectually the rightness and necessity of the combination? If we do, it
would explain the fact that passing rapidly through a room we recognize a picture
to be good, although we cannot say that it has provoked much emotion." Finnis,
supra note 55, at 237 n.98 (quoting C. BELL, ART 26 (1914)).
60. Feinberg, Portiogiaphy and the Criminal Law, 40 U. Prrr. L. REv. 567, 576
(1979).
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old age.' ,6t
This value-defense of pornography would seem to apply to at least
some degree to all pornography, without distinction. On this ap-
proach, pornography is "valuable," if not of "serious" value. This im-
plication itself may give us pause. The more significant issue, however,
is the relationship between the value of extending sexuality into old
age, on the assumption that this cannot be accomplished without
materials that would otherwise be legally obscene, and the value cate-
gories listed in Miller. The hedonic or sensuality value involved would
appear not to fit readily within the categories of literary, artistic, polit-
ical, or scientific value except in some controversially attenuated sense.
So much the worse, it may be thought, for the unduly restrictive Miller
categories. But the Miller value categories should not be viewed as an
obviously failed attempt by the Court to sum up all possible kinds of
value in the world into four categories. Some or all pornography may
be of hedonic value. Some or all pornography may be of commercial
value. These sorts of value, however, simply do not count, in the con-
text of obscenity determinations, because they have no substantial rela-
tion to the range of purposes or values underlying our common desire
to specially protect a realm of free speech. 62
A fair reading of even the great champion of freedom of speech,
John Stuart Mill, or any of his historical predecessors in this regard,
leaves the door open to reasonable state suppression of materials that
even the Miller test itself is normally thought to protect. 63 It is clear
that "Mill did not consider . . . public displays of 'dirty pictures,' and
the like, to be forms of 'symbolic speech,' or expressions of opinion of
any kind.' '64 Professor Feinberg goes on to observe, in accord with the
broad values underlying our devotion to the special protection ac-
corded speech, that "[t]he presumption in favor of liberty is much
weaker in the case of conduct that does not have the 'redeeming social
importance' peculiar to assertion, criticism, advocacy, and debate; and
hence, even 'mere offensiveness' in the absence of harm may be a valid
ground for supressing it." '65
Similar responses could be made to other formulations of the values
arguably deriving from some or all pornography, or deriving in greater
measure from otherwise constitutionally unprotected material. Material
is occasionally held obscene despite expert psychiatric testimony that
61. See United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, Schedule
No. 2102, 709 F.2d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing district court opinion).
62. For a leading, mainstream, consensus-based discussion of the purposes or
values underlying the special protections afforded freedom of speech, see Emerson,
Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878-86 (1963).
63. See Wright, supra note 19.
64. J. FEINBERG, RIGHTS,JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERiTY 71 (1980) (em-
phasis in the original).
65. Id.
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the materials at issue at least "had some educational value." 66 It is pos-
sible, though, to "educate" oneself about matters of only tangential
first amendment concern. It is equally possible, allegedly, to "educate"
oneself, or to derive educational value, through the voluntary ingestion
of hallucinogenic substances. That educational value may be allegedly
derived from an activity does not convert that activity into speech, let
alone protected speech.
It is possible, however, to "rationalize" pornographic activity
through the allegation that pornography at least implicitly sends a cog-
nizable message, or conveys an arguably important idea. It has thus
been argued, for example, that "[i]n opposition to the sorrowing Cath-
olic dismissal of sexuality as an unfortunate and spiritually superficial
concomitant of propagation, pornography affords the alternative idea
of the independent status of sexuality as a profound and shattering ec-
stasy."' 6 7 Alternatively, Professor Dworkin has argued that in this con-
text, "[r]estricted publication leaves a certain hypothesis entirely
unmade: the hypothesis that sex should enter all levels of public cul-
ture on the same standing as soap opera romance or movie
trivia .... 68
These sorts of ideas may qualify as sufficiently implicating political
value under Miller. What seems more dubious is whether, in a given
transaction involving allegedly obscene materials, any such message or
idea would have been genuinely intended by the sender or seller of the
material, or even whether any such message would actually have been
"received" by the purchaser. No one doubts that such transactions
may be "rationalized" by acute, uninvolved third parties who may seek
to invest with political value a transaction otherwise devoid of such
value. Similarly, diligent criminal defense attorneys should be able to
incorporate such intellectualizations, post hoc, into their theory of the
case. In a given case, however, a reasonable juror might well conclude
that none of this Olympian discourse was any sufficient part of the in-
tent of the seller, or of either buyer or seller, and the law might reason-
ably hold that this fact matters for free speech purposes. After all, a
flower in a crannied wall may inspire articulate political reflections in a
sufficiently sensitive observer. This does not make the deliberate plac-
ing of the flower an act of protected speech, independent of the actual
intent of the person placing the flower.
As to Professor Dworkin's "unmade hypothesis" argument,6 9 it
66. People v. Sequoia Books, Inc., 146 Il. App. 3d 1, 3, 496 N.E.2d 740, 741
(1986).
67. Richards, supra note 57, at 81 (citing, inter alia, S. SONTAG, STYLES Or RADI-
CAL WILL 35-73 (1969) for the proposition that pornography can be a "unique me-
diurn for giving expression to the transcendence of the personality by sexual
transgression").
68. R. DWORKIN, A MATIER OF PRINCIPLE 342 (1985).
69. Id.
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seems clear that such an argument confuses the expression of a given
hypothesis with its realization in practice. Why, on Professor Dworkin's
hypothesis, could one not argue that a misdemeanor restriction on the
act of littering itself leaves entirely unmade the hypothesis that littered
and unlittered landscapes should be treated as on a par? One can ar-
gue for the positive value or appropriateness of littering, or make that
hypothesis, without engaging in the activity of littering itself. One can
just as easily make a passionate, articulate, comprehensive defense of
pornography and its value without buying or selling the materials them-
selves. Defending pornography is not the same as selling it, just as ad-
vocating the burning of one's draft card is not the same as burning it in
protest. 70 Contrary to Dworkin, the defense, or the advocacy, itself
makes the hypothesis.
This is not to suggest that the process of rescuing or not rescuing
allegedly obscene works on value grounds is devoid of any irony. Pro-
fessor Kalven distinguished between pornography that was "at best"
unrelated to any serious human concerns, and that was "at worst" a
depiction of "a degrading, hostile, alien view of the sexual experi-
ence." 7 ' Surprisingly, it may be pornography "at its worst" that has a
better claim to free speech protection than pornography "at its best" in
this sense. Pornography at its "best," devoid of any reference to seri-
ous human concerns, may simply not implicate the Miller value catego-
ries. At least some pornography at its "worst," in taking a degrading
"view" of the sexual experience, may claim protection precisely in vir-
tue of taking, more or less intentionally, a coherent, articulate, if un-
popular "view" of serious matters. 72
If, on the other hand, it is possible to treat some or all alleged ob-
scenity as not intending to convey an ideological or political point, it
becomes possible for the prosecution to more readily and uncontrover-
sially meet the "value" absence criterion of Miller. Perhaps "[t]he por-
nographic item is a sexual surrogate. It takes pictorial or linguistic
form only because some individuals achieve sexual gratification in that
way." 73 To the extent this characterization is an accurate depiction of
at least some pornography, such materials should present easy cases
under the Miller value criterion as interpreted above.
70. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
71. Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 13 (P.
Kurland ed. 1960).
72. Thus the double edge of the feminist critique of some or all pornography
as expressing a disfavored repressive male ideology. See, on this issue, the con-
trasting views ofJudge Easterbrook in American Booksellers' Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771
F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986); Mackinnon, Pornography as
Sex Discrimination, 4 LAw & INEQUALITY 38 (1986): Stone, Anti-Pornography Legislation
as Viewpoint Discrimination, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 461 (1986); Sunstein, Pornogra-
phy and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589.
73. F. SCHAUER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 181 (1982).
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XII. THE ROLES OF EXPERTS AND JURIES
This Article's approach to the Miller value criterion admittedly may
require limitations on some lines of analysis that have found favor with
the Court. As seen above, value may be attributable to a work, or a
coherent impersonal idea may have been evidently intended by a work,
without a jury necessarily perceiving such value, or such an idea, with-
out assistance. In the detection of value in a work, a consensual expert
may be able to convincingly make manifest, to the jury's satisfaction,
literary value that the jury might otherwise not have perceived. While
evaluating books or films is not categorically beyond the ken of ordi-
nary persons, expert opinion may well, in a particular case, aid the
jury's understanding of the relevant value considerations.7 4
In the context of value determinations, therefore, courts should be
reluctant to extend the Supreme Court's observation that the allegedly
obscene materials themselves "are the best evidence of what they rep-
resent,"' 7 5 or that placing the materials themselves in evidence sup-
plants the need for expert testimony. 76 While in some respects, even
"hard core pornography . . . can and does speak for itself,"7 7 our soci-
ety is not so utterly democratic as to invariably assume that the opinion,
on artistic value, of the curator of the local museum is no better or
worse than the untutored reactions of the local jury. In some sense,
James Joyce's Ulysses is the best evidence of its own literary value, but an
expert witness may appreciably aid the jury in mediating the confronta-
tion between text and jury. In certain respects, then, it is not true that
"[s]tudying the material for hours doesn't tell a judge any more about
its obscene character than he knew when he first looked at it."?T8 The
difficult, even insoluble, issues center instead on the precise deference
to be given to jury verdicts that are inconsistent with some portion of
the expert testimony, or all of the expert testimony, introduced on the
issue of the work's value. The obscenity cases have been read by at
least one commentator to imply that "[t]o prevail on appeal, the de-
fendant would have to show that as a matter of law the material was so
clearly meritorious that the jury should not have been allowed to find it
otherwise." 79 This is a demanding standard in the free speech area,
particularly in conjunction with the settled principle that the jury is
74. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 33 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
75. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton. 413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973).
76. See id.
77. Id. at 56 n.6 (quoting United States v. Wild, 422 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 986 (1971)).
78. Kalven, supra note 71, at 44 (quoting Thurman Arnold). Cf. Feinberg, Por-
nography and the Criminal Law, 40 U. Prrr. L. REV. 567, 588 (1979) ("Pure pornogra-
phy is easy to recognize; what are hard to spot are the 'redeeming' units or aspects
of expression in such impure admixtures as artfully pornographic films and erotic
realism in novels.").
79. O'Neil, Federalism and Obscenity, 9 U. TOL. L. REV. 731, 751 (1978).
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"not bound to accept the opinion of any expert in weighing the evi-
dence of obscenity .... ,,80
While it is easy to imagine a reasonable jury ignoring the self-serv-
ing, overblown claims of professional "experts" in favor of the patent
vacuousness of the allegedly obscene materials themselves, it is also
possible to imagine a jury's ignoring the disinterested, credible testi-
mony of distinguished, mainstream scholars, on the "grounds" that the
jury believes that sexually explicit, deeply offensive materials may be
proscribed regardless of any literary value. This approach, however at-
tractive to a particular jury, would plainly not be consistent with Miller.
The appellate courts should not be reluctant, on appropriate occasions,
and on appropriate issues, to exercise their power "to conduct an in-
dependent review of constitutional claims .... 81
The courts should on the other hand be extremely reluctant to, in
effect, inform local juries that they were incontrovertably mistaken in
finding the particular materials at issue to have been patently offensive
to local community standards.8 2 It is neither especially undignified,
however, nor institutionally burdensome, 3 nor a matter of presumptu-
ous judicial overreaching, for the courts to review on appeal a staid
amicus brief discoursing on the unsuspected literary value of the work
in question. It is worth reflecting on the possibility that it is inherently
prejudicial to the defendant, at least in a loose sense, to ask the jury to
pass on the question of the work's literary value just after the same jury
has determined that the work appeals to the prurient interest in sex and
portrays sex in a patently offensive way according to community stan-
dards.8 4 As a matter of individual psychology, more than group dy-
namics, it may be asking a lot to expect a jury to stay its hand by finding
the necessary value after it has found patent offensiveness. Searching,
even aggressive appellate review on the value element may compensate
for such a tendency on the part of the jury. If the court on review finds
sufficient value of the proper sort, it should not be reluctant to inter-
vene to save the material.
XIII. THE UNNECESSARY COMPLEXITY OF THE MILLER STANDARD
An intriguing question, though, is that of the constitutionally per-
missible consequences of the finding by ajury and reviewing court that
the material does not meet the value standard established by Miller.
One virtue of this Article's interpretation of the value requirement is
80. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 100 (1974).
81. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974).
82. But cf. id. at 161 (holding that the film at issue "could not, as a matter of
constitutional law, be found to depict sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way .... ").
83. See Paris Adult Theatre 1, 413 U.S. at 91-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
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that, problems of vagueness, notice, and due process aside, it becomes
insignificant from the standpoint of the free speech clause what the re-
maining elements of the obscenity test are, once the material is deter-
mined to lack serious value, in the strong sense of not seeking to
convey an idea within the Miller value categories. If no such idea con-
veyance is intended, the remainder of the obscenity test becomes irrele-
vant for free speech purposes, because the values or purposes
underlying the free speech clause are, by hypothesis, not significantly
implicated.
To put the point concretely, consider the constitutional role of the
prurient interest element under Miller. Under this element, the trier of
fact is to determine whether an average person in the appropriate com-
munity, applying those community standards, and taking the work as a
whole, would find that the work appeals to a prurient interest in sex. 8 5
Obviously, a number of practical and interpretive problems lurk in this
element. The Supreme Court has taken it upon itself to discourse at
length on the nature of the concept of prurience, and to authoritatively
draw a distinction between normal sexual desires and those that are
abnormal or morbid. 8 6 Whether the Court's distinctions in this regard
are justified is not the point. Rather, it should simply not be necessary,
as far as the free speech clause is concerned, to fret about the nature of
prurience, or any related issue. Again, assuming fair notice, and the
absence of vagueness or due process problems, and assuming no extra-
neous constitutional issues are involved, such as equal protection, the
courts should be able to enforce a statutory ban on material that is
without free speech value and that is patently offensive under the sec-
ond element of the Miller test. If a work seeks to convey no idea, on
the view elaborated above, and the work "depicts or describes in a pa-
tently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applica-
ble state law...,,,s7 why should it be constitutionally protected, all else
equal? Why should the state be constitutionally required to show that
the sexual interest was, on someone's or anyone's standards, excessive,
or abnormal, or shameful, or morbid?
It follows a fortiori that most partial revisions, simplifications, and
reinterpretations of the prurient interest requirement would be permis-
sible, under the free speech clause, as this Article interpreted the "seri-
ous value" requirement. And a parallel argument can easily be made
for simplifying, if not utterly dispensing with, the patent offense re-
quirement. If a work fails this Article's conception of the "value" re-
quirement, thus not significantly implicating free speech values, and if
it is found to appeal to a prurient interest in sex, on some reasonable
85. See id.
86. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 105 S. Ct. 2794 (1985).
87. See Willer, 413 U.S. at 24.
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test, then why, all else equal, should the state also be required to sepa-
rately show anything like the current patent offensiveness element?
This Article's reinterpretation of the Court's "serious value" crite-
rion may well be attractive on its own merits. Even if not, it clearly
possesses the considerable practical advantage, as we have seen, of al-
lowing a substantial legitimate simplification of the other elements of
the Miller test, allowing the courts to bypass many intractable or vexing
issues as, for example, that of the constitutionally permissible scope of
the community that may be selected when applying community stan-
dards on the prurient interest and patent offensiveness elements.
While the Court itself has not adopted the recommended approach in
either letter or practice, it has occasionally at least verbally accepted
portions of the underlying logic of such a view. Even in a case contem-
poraneous with Miller, the Court recognized that "[w]here communica-
tion of ideas, protected by the First Amendment, is not involved, ...
the mere fact ... some human 'utterances' or 'thoughts' may be inci-
dentally affected does not bar the State from acting to protect legiti-
mate state interests." 8 8 If the communication of the requisite ideas is
not involved in a given case, there is little point in imposing numerous,
specific additional substantive and evidentiary burdens on the state, at
least in the name of the first amendment.
XIV. COMMUNITY STANDARDS AND REASONABLE PERSON STANDARDS
The case law has established that the "prurient interest" and "pa-
tently offensive" elements of obscenity are to be shown with reference
to an attempt by the finder of fact to ascertain, if they are available, and
apply contemporary community standards, as somehow defined.8 9 The
cases following Miller, however, did not definitively resolve the question
of whether some sort of contemporary community standards test also
applies to the third element of Miller's obscenity test, that of "serious
value."
In Smith v. United States,90 the Court observed in dicta, and in non-
committal dicta at that, that "[1]iterary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.., is not discussed in Miller in terms of contemporary community
standards.1'-  Focusing on what Miller did not hold, or discuss, is
hardly the equivalent of establishing what the Court actually did hold,
or would have held, in Miller. Smith simply does not clearly, unequivo-
88. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 67.
89. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24, 30 (prurient interest must be decided by refer-
ence to an average person applying contemporary community standards); Smith v.
United States, 431 U.S. 291, 301 (1977) ("the jury must measure patent offensive-
ness against contemporary community standards"). It may be, at least according to
some courts, that no such community standards may exist. See State v. Kam, 726
P.2d 263, 265 (Hawaii 1986).
90. 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
91. Id. at 301.
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cally endorse a national, or "objective," or expert-based standard for
the serious value determination. At the precise point in Smith quoted
immediately above, the Court cites Frederick Schauer's text on obscen-
ity,9 2 but Professor Schauer's analysis on this point essentially reports
the lack of a definitive Supreme Court holding. Schauer indicates that
the contemporary community standards analysis "does not necessarily
apply"9 3 to the serious value element. Professor Schauer then carefully
observes that "[tihere has never been any indication by the Court that
the merit of the material itself, as embodied in this part of the test,
should or can vary from community to community." '9 4 On the merits,
though, Professor Schauer went on to contend that:
If this test were subject to the inherent variations of local community
standards, then First Amendment values would vary with time and
place, a result which the courts have properly sought to avoid. Whether
a work has literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, then, unlike the
prurient-interest and patent-offensiveness requirements, is not subject
to the community-standards factor and not affected by the change to
local standards. 9 5
Professor Schauer's analysis on the merits is supported, in blunt fash-
ion, by Professor Richards' declaration that applying the serious value
test relative to community standards "would be absurd."' 96 Professor
Richards' logic is that "[t]he literary and dramatic value, for example,
of Shakespeare is not affected by the disvaluation of his work by some
parochial community." 97
This analysis was implicitly adopted, in the absence of a definitive
Supreme Court pronouncement, in cases such as State v. Princess Cinema
of Milwaukee, Inc.98 In that case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court con-
cluded that "[t]he standard for assessing the third [serious value] part
of the Miller test is an objective one. The individual cannot be expected
to anticipate whether a particular community will consider an allegedly
obscene item to have serious merit under the categories enumerated in
Miller.""p
92. F. SCHAUER, THE LAw OF OBSCENITv (1976).
93. Id. at 123.
94. Id. at 123-24.
95. Id. at 124 (citation omitted). There are even some contemporary argu-
ments that a community standards test is too indefinite and amorphous on the is-
sues of patent offensiveness and prurient appeal. See, e.g., State v. Henry, 302 Or.
510, 513, 732 P.2d 9, 10 (1987).
96. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Aoral Theory of the First
Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 71 n.132 (1974).
97. Id.
98. 96 Wis. 2d 646, 292 N.W.2d 807 (1980).
99. Id. at 654, 292 N.W.2d at 811. See also United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d
826, 835 (11 th Cir. 1982) (relying on Smith, 431 U.S. 291 (1977)); State v. Regan,
97 Wash. 2d 47, 640 P.2d 725, 731 (Utter, J., concurring) (the "serious value"
element as "an objective criterion") (relying on Smith, 431 U.S. 291 (1977)). Cf.
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This approach has not been universally accepted, though, as is illus-
trated by cases such as People v. Morrison 100 and People v. Pope.10 ' In
Morrison, the Illinois Court of Appeals was confronted with appellant's
claim that it was constitutionally impermissible to allow a jury to apply
community, as opposed to "objective," standards in determining, on
the value element, whether the magazines at issue "were utterly without
redeeming social value."' 0 2 The Illinois Court of Appeals disposed of
this argument in the following terms:
We choose to dismiss this argument by simply pointing out that the
United States Supreme Court has never held that an objective standard
as opposed to a community one should be applied in adjudging if
materials are 'utterly without redeeming social value'. On the facts of
this case, we see no reason why we should hold otherwise. 10 3
Of course the court might as easily have said that the Supreme Court
has never held a community standard to be applicable, as opposed to a
national, or objective, or "expertise-based" standard, and it might then
have at least pointed to the dicta in Smith.' 0 4 The court's assumption
that one approach rather than another is to be logically presumed from
the Supreme Court's not resolving the issue was therefore mysterious.
It is equally mysterious why the court assumed, as it apparently did,
that the question of whether to apply community-based or objective
standards on the value element should somehow depend on the facts of
the individual case.
A different panel of the same district of the Illinois Court of Appeals
decided People v. Pope 105 on the same day as the Morrison case. The
court in Pope was equally reticent in providing affirmative justification
for adhering to or at least approving a contemporary community stan-
dards test for the value element. In Pope, the Illinois Court of Appeals
sought to distinguish the Princess Cinema 106 case from Wisconsin with-
out reaching the substantive policy considerations, 0 7 and in the same
oddly negative tone manifested in Morrison, observed correctly, if not
State v. Henry, 302 Or. 510, 513, 732 P.2d 9, 10 (1987) (making an analogous
argument regarding the prurient interest and patent offense elements, even where
categories of proscribed depictions are statutorily specified).
100. 138 Ill. App. 3d 595, 486 N.E.2d 345 (1985).
101. 138 I1. App. 3d 726, 486 N.E.2d 350 (1985).
102. 138 Ill. App. 3d at 600, 486 N.E.2d at 349. Obviously, the "utterly with-
out redeeming social value" formulation, inspired by Roth and lemoirs, is no longer
thought to be mandated by the federal constitution. While it is more restrictive
than the Ailler formulation in some respects, it is less restrictive in others, and may
be unconstitutional under the federal constitution, even if it is thought to comport
with the constitution of Illinois.
103. Id.
104. 431 U.S. at 301.
105. 138 Il. App. 3d 726, 486 N.E.2d 350 (1985).
106. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
107. See 138 Ill. App. 3d at 735, 486 N.E.2d at 355.
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satisfyingly, that "the United States Supreme Court has never held that
an objective standard as opposed to a community one should be ap-
plied in adjudging if materials are 'utterly without redeeming social
value.' "108
The United States Supreme Court took certiorari on Pope and Mori-
son and rendered an opinion that is notable chiefly for the divergence
between what it apparently says and what it apparently intends. Repudi-
ating the prospect of holding a work hostage to local tyranny, the Court
majority declares that "U]ust as the ideas' 0 9 a work represents need not
obtain majority approval to merit protection, neither, insofar as the
First Amendment is concerned, does the value of the work vary from
community to community based on the degree of local acceptance it
has won.' °1 0 The logical inference is clear, and the Court evidently
intends to draw it. However, it then unfelicitously concludes: "The
proper inquiry is not whether an ordinary member of any given com-
munity would find serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value
in allegedly obscene material, but whether a reasonable person would
find such value in the material, taken as a whole." I1I The sticking point
is the not inadvertent use of the word "would," as opposed to "could."
The problem is that reasonable persons differ not only as to tastes, but
as to judgments as to value. The set of reasonable persons, abstracted
from a community, includes persons of both demanding and permissive
judgment. If the set of reasonable judges is evidently split on the value
of a work, then literally, the "would find" standard, as opposed to a"could find" standard, mandates a jury finding of a lack of serious
value, despite the majority's professions.' 12
The majority in Pope is clearly not unaware of the problematic na-
ture of their formulation, if for no other reason than that Justice Ste-
vens calls the matter to their attention in dissent as outlined im-
mediately above.' 13 The Court could have more perspicuously pro-
tected allegedly obscene materials if it had wished. Such an approach
might focus on the judgment of value of some significant subset of the
tutored or untutored judgments of reasonable people. That it did not
do so may reflect not so much an indifference to excessive linguistic
fastidiousness as a certain unresolved, not fully articulated wariness in
108. Id. The same issue was raised on appeal, but not decided, in People v.
Hall, 143 Il. App. 3d 766, 491 N.E.2d 757 (1986).
109. It seems improper to infer from phrases such as this that a Supreme
Court majority, or any Justice, believes that everything between front and back cov-
ers must necessarily contain "ideas" in any constitutionally relevant sense.
110. Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918, 1921 (1987).
111. Id.
112. The majority reiterates that "the mere fact that only a minority of a pop-
ulation may believe a work has serious value does not mean the 'reasonable person'
standard would not be met." Id. at n.3.
113. Id. at 1926 (StevensJ., dissenting).
[Vol. 22:315
OBSCENITY
saving otherwise obscene materials based on what a person could be-
lieve or judge without transgressing the boundaries of reasonableness.
The Court majority may fear a standard that would unequivocally pro-
tect in all communities any and all material that a reasonable, but ex-
tremely permissive, person - the "reasonable libertine" - would
judge of the requisite value.
Even the majority opinion in Pope, therefore, manifests unresolved
concerns. The response of Justice Scalia is simply to consider re-exam-
ining the Miller test, on the value element, or in toto. 1 14 Certain Jus-
tices remain committed either to broad decriminalization' 1 5 or to
abolition of even special civil regulation in the area of unobtrusive,
consensual exchange of pornographic materials among competent
adults.' 16 The Court should not feel bound, however, to adopt a more
liberalized standard on the theory that the Constitution and its underly-
ing values mandate such. The free speech and free press clauses do not
enact libertarianism; the undeniable fact that persons may be motivated
by "curiosity"' 17 or a quest for "amusement"'' 8 to transact in other-
wise obscene materials does not invariably implicate significantly any of
the values or purposes that might plausibly be thought to underlie the
first amendment. To the extent that the Court may feel pressed to a
more liberal approach from despair over the difficulties in interpreting
and implementing Miller, this Article has sought to provide some
solace.
114. See id. at 1923 (Scalia, J., concurring).
115. See id. at 1927 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. See id. at 1924 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117. See id. at 1930 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. United States,
431 U.S. 291, 320-21 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
118. Id.
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